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Abstract 
 
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Toyota car recalls have 
highlighted an important legal anomaly that has been overlooked by 
scholars: judicial inconsistency and confusion in ruling whether to 
compensate for the loss in market value of wrongfully affected property. 
This Article seeks to understand this anomaly and, in the process, to build 
a stronger foundation for enabling courts to decide when—and in what 
amounts—to award damages for market value losses. To that end, this 
Article analyzes the normative rationales for generally awarding damages, 
adapting those rationales to derive a theory of damages that covers market 
value losses, not only of financial securities (such as stocks and bonds) but 
also of ordinary products (such as automobiles and lightbulbs).  
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INTRODUCTION 
The turmoil in financial markets has revealed a fundamental legal 
anomaly that, notwithstanding its increasing practical importance, has been 
overlooked by scholars: judicial confusion and inconsistency in ruling 
whether to include the loss in market value (hereinafter, “market value 
loss” or “market value losses”) of wrongfully affected property as legally 
compensable damages.  
Although market value losses can arise in a multitude of contexts, the 
concept is perhaps easiest to understand by dividing the wrongfully 
affected property into two categories: financial-market securities (like 
stocks and bonds), and ordinary products (like automobiles and light 
bulbs). In the context of financial-market securities, market value loss 
represents a loss in the resale value of the securities, in contrast to a loss in 
the value of what the owner of the securities would be paid if the owner 
continues to hold the securities. In the context of ordinary products, market 
value loss represents a loss in the resale value of the product, in contrast to 
a loss in the value of the product’s utility to its owner if the owner 
continues to hold the product. More generically, market value loss 
represents a loss in the resale value of any affected property, in contrast to 
a loss in the value of the property’s utility to its owner if the owner 
continues to hold the property.  
As discussed in Part I below, courts sometimes include, but often 
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exclude, market value loss as legally compensable damages without 
meaningfully articulating the reasons for inclusion or exclusion. Indeed, 
most judicial opinions do not even explicitly recognize the concept of 
market value loss, at most giving it implicit recognition in the calculation 
of damages.  
This Article seeks to derive a normative theory of when market value 
loss should be included in legally compensable damages. Part I of the 
Article reviews and examines the applicable judicial precedents. Parts II 
and III then attempt, informed in part by those precedents, to derive a more 
normative theory of when to compensate for market value loss. Finally, 
Part IV proposes a rule, based on this theory, that courts can use when 
considering market value losses and also provides examples of how that 
rule could be applied. 
In the discussion below, one should not conflate market value loss with 
“pure economic loss” (sometimes called “economic loss”), a term used to 
refer to negligently caused financial losses to a person without other injury 
to that person—the classic example being an employee who loses wages 
when a negligent tortfeasor’s action damages a factory where the employee 
is working.1 Although some have argued that awarding damages for pure 
economic loss might create “disproportionate penalties for wrongful 
behavior”2 and “raise[] the specter of widespread tort liability,”3 most 
jurisdictions in the United States now allow at least some recovery for pure 
economic loss.4 This Article does not, and it should not, engage that debate 
because market value loss and pure economic loss are fundamentally 
different concepts.5 A market-value-loss inquiry can arise in connection 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  See Adams v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 217 (Ct. App. 1975).  
 2.  Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1534–36 (1985) (arguing that “the proximate cause limitation on negligence 
liability illustrates [this] concern about proportionality between act and responsibility,” and that 
where there is an “exceedingly low risk of an extremely high magnitude of harm”—such as a 
careless driver causing a fender-bender accident that brings traffic to a standstill in the Brooklyn 
Battery Tunnel during rush hour, thereby causing massive financial losses—awarding negligence 
liability damages for those losses would “generally [be] a very poor candidate for deterrence”). 
 3. Id. at 1514; see also id. at 1525 (inferring from the cases on pure economic loss concern 
over “the specter of collateral claims, virtually unlimited in number, as a result of any given 
accident”).  
 4. See, e.g., A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, 114 P.3d 862, 866 (Colo. 
2005) (holding that a claim for pure economic loss is viable if based on an independent duty of 
care); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112 (N.J. 1985) 
(proposing that pure economic loss that is “particularly foreseeable” should be recoverable); Onita 
Pac. Corp. v. Trs. of Bronson, 843 P.2d 890, 896 (Or. 1992) (holding that a claim for pure 
economic loss can be maintained where it is based on duty beyond the common law duty of 
reasonable care); cf. Rabin, supra note 2, at 1514 (“[T]he reluctance to allow recovery in cases of 
negligent infliction of economic loss has come to be regarded as an aberration, if not an oddity, in 
many quarters.”). For a history of the debate over pure economic loss, see George C. Christie, The 
Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 525, 528–37 (1996). 
 5. This Article nonetheless references the pure-economic-loss debate insofar as aspects of 
that debate may have limited utility in informing the Article’s analysis of market value loss. See 
infra Sections II.C & III.B. 
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with tort, contract, and fraud causes of action,6 whereas a pure-economic-
loss inquiry is limited to tort.7 More substantively, a market-value-loss 
inquiry addresses whether to compensate for a specific type of financial 
loss (loss in market value), whereas a pure-economic-loss inquiry 
addresses whether to compensate for any type of financial loss in the 
absence of non-financial injury.8 To the extent this Article’s examples 
could involve issues of pure economic loss,9 the discussion assumes that 
some form of compensation is otherwise appropriate under applicable law 
and focuses on whether that compensation should include market value 
loss. 
I.  JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 
The cases that grapple with market value loss can be based on legal 
causes of action variously classified as tort, contract, or fraud.10 
Section II.A of this Article will review the normative theories of damages 
underlying each of these causes of action, attempting to derive a theory of 
damages for market value loss. Thus, although fraud is normally classified 
as a tort cause of action,11 this Article’s analysis will not ultimately turn on 
cause-of-action classification but, instead, on the normative underlying 
theories. The judicial precedents are easiest to understand by again 
dividing the wrongfully affected property into the categories of financial-
market securities and ordinary products.  
A.  Financial-Market Securities 
Questions of market value loss are critically tied to financial markets 
and the securities traded therein. Courts tend to answer these questions 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 7. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 8. Thus, unlike pure economic loss, there may be a question of whether to compensate for 
market value loss when there is nonfinancial injury—such as where an employee, physically burned 
by a negligent tortfeasor’s actions in setting fire to the employer’s factory, finds that the market 
value of the employer’s bonds, in which the employee is heavily invested, plummets due to the fire. 
Correlatively, there may a question of whether to compensate for pure economic loss where there is 
financial loss but no market value loss—such as the textual example of an employee losing wages 
when a negligent tortfeasor’s action damages a factory where the employee is working. See supra 
note 1 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B (examining the recent Toyota car recalls and the BP Gulf oil 
spill). 
 10. Tort and contract causes of action encompass products liability, implied warranty, and 
contract breach. See, e.g., Maynard v. Gen. Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating 
that in the context of products liability, “‘[a]n implied warranty is an implied contract’” (quoting 
Hoge v. Ward, 155 S.E. 644, 647 (W. Va. 1930))); JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 704 
(Tex. 2008) (“Conceptually, the breach of an implied warranty can either be in contract or in tort 
depending on the circumstances.”).  
 11. E-mail from James Edelman, Professor of the Law of Obligations, Univ. of Oxford, to the 
author (Sept. 21, 2010) (on file with author) (“There is a big debate in England and Australia about 
whether there is a tort of fraud generally or just a tort of deceit. But all those who believe that there 
is a general action for fraud consider it to be a tort.”). 
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differently depending on whether the securities in question are debt 
securities (like bonds) or equity securities (like stock).12 First consider debt 
securities.  
Only one judicial decision in the United States appears to focus 
explicitly on questions of market value loss in the context of debt 
securities. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,13 
plaintiff MetLife argued that RJR’s leveraged buyout caused the RJR 
bonds held by MetLife to lose their investment-grade rating,14 thereby 
violating an implied covenant to bondholders.15 As a consequence of the 
rating downgrade, the resale value of the bonds plummeted.16 MetLife 
argued that its damages should include this loss in market value. 
The court was willing to “read an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing into [the indenture governing issuance of the bonds] to ensure 
that neither party deprives the other of the fruits of the agreement.”17 
Nonetheless, it declined to recognize the market value loss as legally 
compensable, reasoning that such loss did not constitute the “fruits of the 
agreement” under which the bonds were issued.18 The court held that the 
“substantive ‘fruits’ [of a bond indenture only] include the periodic and 
regular payment of interest and the eventual repayment of principal.”19 
Even after RJR’s leveraged buyout, these payments were expected to 
continue.20 The court also asserted that reformulating the bond indenture to 
(in effect) mitigate market value loss would “interfere with and destabilize 
the [bond] market”  by ignoring the market expectation “that the terms of 
an indenture will be upheld.”21 
The reasoning of the RJR Nabisco court is questionable. Its formalistic 
rationale, that the “fruits” of a bond indenture only include payment of 
principal and interest, ignores that bonds are rarely held by any given 
investor to maturity.22 And the court’s seemingly policy-oriented rationale, 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Virtually all financial-market securities can be divided, more or less, into debt or equity 
securities, although some securities may have aspects of both. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CARNEY, 
CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 196–202 (2005) (outlining the features of various 
financial instruments). 
 13. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 14. For a description of how bond ratings are structured, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (“[T]he highest 
rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings descending to AA, then to A, and then to 
BBB and below. . . . The higher the rating, the lower the rating agency has assessed the credit risk 
associated with the securities in question. . . . Ratings below BBB- are deemed non-investment 
grade, and indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be speculative.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 15. RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1516. 
 16. Id. at 1506. 
 17. Id. at 1517 (internal quotations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 1518.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 1519. 
 21. Id. at 1520. 
 22. GEORGE FONTANILLS, THE OPTIONS COURSE: HIGH PROFIT & LOW STRESS TRADING 
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that compensating for market value loss would interfere with and 
destabilize the bond market,23 appears to ignore the much more profoundly 
destabilizing effect on bond markets that would result from ignoring the 
reality of bond trading.24 Nonetheless, the case may well be decided 
correctly on its facts because RJR previously had negotiated the 
elimination of a covenant in the bond indenture that would have barred the 
leveraged buyout.25 Oddly, the court did not articulate its decision based on 
that negotiation. 
In contrast to debt securities, numerous judicial decisions address 
market value loss in the context of equity securities. Unlike the RJR 
Nabisco court’s limited perception of the “fruits” of a debt security, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]hares are normally purchased 
with an eye toward a later sale.”26 Damages are therefore often awarded for 
losses in resale value of stock.27  
A question remains, though, of how to measure these damages.28 Many 
courts employ a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages.29 Other courts, 
however, employ an out-of-pocket measure of damages,30 based on the 
desire to avoid the “speculative nature of reconstructing a world in which 
the plaintiffs’ expectations come true . . . .”31  
B.  Ordinary Products 
The judicial precedents on compensating market value loss are likewise 
conflicted where the wrongfully affected property is ordinary products.32 
                                                                                                                     
METHODS 384 (2d ed. 2005). 
 23. RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1520. 
 24. Although freely reading covenants into bond indentures could interfere with bond 
markets, the court’s reasoning appears to focus not on whether a covenant was breached but 
whether a breached covenant should entitle bondholders to market value damages.  
 25. RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1510–11. 
 26. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
 27. See id. at 345 (indicating that the purpose of the securities laws is “to protect [investors] 
against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause”). Congress has gone so far as 
making market value loss a required element in an action for securities fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(4) (2006). 
 28. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that out-of-pocket, benefit-
of-the-bargain, or other alternative methods can be appropriate measures of damages). 
 29. Id. at 114. This measure of damages is often used, for example, in common-law deceit and 
misrepresentation actions, after which private securities fraud actions are generally patterned. Dura 
Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342–43. 
 30. See, e.g., Panos v. Island Gem Enters., Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 31. Id. at 176. This measure of damages is often used, for example, in implied securities fraud 
actions. Id. It may well be that the distinction between the measure of damages often used in 
implied securities fraud actions and the measure of damages often used in the actions referenced 
supra note 28 relate less to logic and more to path dependence in following earlier judicial 
precedent.  
 32. In some cases, like breach of contract for the sale of goods, a plaintiff has no opportunity 
to use the property at issue; the only measure of damages then depends on the market value of 
substitute goods. This Article, in contrast, addresses cases in which property which could render 
value to the plaintiff by either being sold or used is wrongfully affected.  
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The leading cases are Miller v. William Chevrolet/GEO, Inc.33 and Wallis 
v. Ford Motor Co.34 In Miller, an Illinois appellate court reversed a lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff who, in a 
consumer fraud case, had sought damages for the diminished resale value 
of an automobile.35 The appellate court explained that “Illinois courts have 
generally allowed damages claims based on diminished value of a product 
regardless of whether it has yet malfunctioned . . . .”36 In contrast, however, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court in Wallis, also a fraud case involving 
automobiles, refused to award damages for diminished resale value, 
reasoning that the car buyer only bargained for a safe and reliable vehicle.37  
Although lacking precedential value, a recent settlement by Ford Motor 
Co. of products-liability and false-advertising lawsuits implicitly 
recognized damages for market value loss. The lawsuits alleged that Ford 
hid defects in the tires on its Explorer sport-utility vehicles, and that these 
SUVs lost resale value after a tire recall in May 2000. Ford settled by 
giving almost a million Explorer SUV customers $500 each toward a new 
model or $300 each toward other Ford vehicles.38  
Judicial precedents regarding compensation for market value loss are 
thus inconsistent. Part II below seeks to derive a more coherent, normative 
theory of when courts should award damages for market value loss.  
II.  TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF DAMAGES FOR 
MARKET VALUE LOSS 
Recall that the cases grappling with market value loss can be based on 
legal causes of action variously classified as tort, contract, or fraud.39 
Section II.A below compares the general theoretical basis for awarding 
damages—using theoretical in the sense of an abstract of general 
                                                                                                                     
 33. 762 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 34. 208 S.W.3d 153 (Ark. 2005). 
 35. Miller, 762 N.E.2d at 4–5. 
 36. Id. at 10. 
 37. 208 S.W.3d at 159 (“[T]here is no allegation in the complaint that the Ford Explorer has 
not, to date, been exactly what Wallis bargained for; that is, he does not allege that the vehicle has 
actually malfunctioned or that the defect has manifested itself.”); see also id. at 156 (“In sum, the 
principle undergirding our case law is that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are only awarded in 
fraud cases where a party proves that the product received is not what was bargained for; that is, the 
product received in fact manifests that it is different from that which was promised.”). Just as the 
RJR Nabisco court narrowly interpreted the “fruits” of a debt security, the reasoning of the Wallis 
court exhibits a limited understanding of what purchasers “bargain” for in a new car (that the 
bargain is merely for a safe and reliable vehicle). As this Article will later show, the expected resale 
value is one of the “benefits of the bargain” often considered by car buyers. See infra notes 90–92 
and accompanying text.  
 38. Settlement Agreement and Release at 22, Ford Explorer Cases, Nos. 4266 & 4270 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. 2007), available at http://www.saccourt.ca.gov/coordinated-cases/ford-explorer/ford-
explorer.aspx (click on “Online Document Viewer”) (compiling information on the 
Bridgestone/Firestone Tire cases settlement). 
 39. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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understanding, as opposed to an independent normative analysis40—with 
the more specific theories for awarding damages associated with those 
causes of action. Section II.B then uses these theories to model a normative 
theory of damages for market value loss. Although this approach might be 
criticized as deriving an “ought” from what is,41 I believe that the 
transparent articulation of the approach gives it legitimacy.42 
A.  The Theoretical Basis for Awarding Damages 
In general, “the object of the law in awarding damages for civil injury 
and breach of contract is to put the plaintiff in the same position . . . as he 
would have been had there been no injury or breach; that is to compensate 
him for the injury actually sustained.”43 Various theories have been 
advanced to try to explain why damages should be equal to the injury.44 
One such theory, which forms the basis of tort damages, is that damages 
should be equal to the injury in order to avoid private retribution, such as 
“‘blood feuds.’”45 Damages equal to the injury restore a sense of fairness, 
making private retribution unlikely.46 Another such theory is economic: 
that imposing damages equal to the injury incentivizes people to internalize 
the social costs of their behavior.47 In the absence of damages, rational 
people will consider taking an action if the utility they derive from the 
action outweighs its costs, ignoring costs the action might impose on 
others.48 Imposing tort damages equal to the injury sustained motivates 
rational people to consider the total costs of their actions, thereby more 
                                                                                                                     
 40. I thank my colleague Timothy Endicott for helping to articulate this distinction. 
 41. Cf. ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 18 (2d ed. 1991) (contending that “‘oughts’ cannot be derived from what is”) (citing G.E. 
MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA §§ 10–14 (Thomas Baldwin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993)). 
 42. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 775, 776–77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis onto a positive assumption—in this case, 
taking the existence of corporate reorganizations in bankruptcy law as a given to put forth a 
suggestion to improve the reorganization process).  
 43. WALLACE HUGH WIGMAN ET AL., THE ESSENTIALS OF COMMERCIAL LAW 82 (1913) (citing 
Rockwood v. Allen, 7 Mass. 254, 256 (1811)); see also Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 
(1924); Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1970); Ballow v. PHICO Ins. 
Co., 878 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1994); Hanna v. Martin, 49 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1951). 
 44. For a parallel discussion of why damages should be awarded under English law for civil 
injury and breach of contract, see ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 9–10 (3d ed. 2004). 
 45. Benjamin Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 83 (1998) (citations omitted) (discussing German blood feuds). Although this rationale should be 
equally applicable to bodily and non-bodily injury, tort damages for bodily injury are often closely 
tied to societal expectations regarding that special context. E-mail from George Christie, James B. 
Duke Professor of Law, Duke Law School, to the author (Sep. 22, 2010) (on file with author). My 
Article does not purport to address bodily injury damages.     
 46. Zipursky, supra note 45, at 84–85 (generally observing that damages equal to the injury 
are necessary to avoid unfairness to the tort victim). 
 47. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 6–
8 (1987). 
 48. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 340 (5th ed. 2008). 
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efficiently allocating societal resources.49   
Damages for breach of contract are likewise held to be equal to the 
injury. Under the autonomy theory of contracts, that measure of damages is 
needed to make contractual promises credible.50 Law and economics 
scholars take a similar view. Damages are meant to induce the optimal 
level of performance, and damages that are too high or too low will cause 
parties to over- or under-rely on the contract.51 Damages therefore need to 
be just right, or equal to the injury.52  
It therefore is clear in tort and contract that damages should be equal to 
the injury, but that begs the question of what “equal to the injury” means. 
In a tort context, injury appears to be measured by the loss in the victim’s 
reasonable expectations caused by the tort—such as mental and physical 
suffering, lost working time, necessary expenditures to treat physical harm, 
and compensation for a decrease in earning power resulting from the 
harm.53 In effect, the victim reasonably expects not to be injured by 
tortious action; compensating the victim for these amounts is deemed to be 
equivalent to restoring that expectation.54 
In a contract context, the injury is the lost expectations suffered by the 
party who has been subjected to the breach, based on what the contract 
would have provided.55 Indeed, courts commonly refer to contract-breach 
damages as expectations damages: “Ordinarily, when a court concludes 
that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces the broken promise by 
protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he made the 
contract.”56 In practice, courts limit expectations damages by a 
reasonableness standard, to expectations that were reasonably foreseeable 
(such as expectations arising in the ordinary course of business or that were 
specifically disclosed when the contract was formed)57 and could be 
objectively valued.58   
The damages rule for fraud is similar to that of tort and contract.59 The 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Id.  
 50. See LANDES, supra note 47 and accompanying text. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS 
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 20–21 (1981). 
 51. See FRIED, supra note 50, at 20–21 (1981). 
 52. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 48, at 245. 
 53. See, e.g., Kapuschinsky v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.S.C. 1966); Ariz. Copper 
Co. v. Burciaga, 177 P. 29, 33 (Ariz. 1918), overruled on other grounds by Consol. Ariz. Smelting 
Co. v. Egich, 199 P. 132, 136 (Ariz. 1920). 
 54. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 412 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that 
damages should be equal to the “deprivation of the reasonable expectation” of future benefits 
caused by the injury) (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916)). 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).  
 56. Id. cmt. a (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. § 351.  
 58. Id. § 344 cmt. b. Although limiting expectations damages to expectations that can be 
objectively valued might seem an artificial restriction, objective indicators (such as market pricing) 
often serve as the starting point for forming expectations. 
 59. In the United Kingdom, the damages rule for fraud may be different. See Doyle v. Olby 
(Ironmongers) Ltd., [1969] 2 Q.B. 158 at 159 (distinguishing the proper measure of damages for 
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majority of U.S. courts grant benefit-of-the-bargain damages,60 recognizing 
the injury as “what an individual might reasonably expect to receive based 
upon the representations of another.”61 The injury is therefore the 
difference between the victim’s reasonable expectations, which were 
formed in reliance on the representations of the injurer, and what the 
injurer actually delivered.62 Like damages in tort and contract, damages for 
fraud thus preserve the reasonable expectations of the defrauded party. 
B.  Modeling a Normative Theory of Damages for Market Value Loss 
Damages should thus theoretically preserve the reasonable expectations 
of an injured party. My normative theory of damages for market value loss 
therefore starts with the framework that such damages should be equal to 
the lost expectations of a reasonable person in the same circumstances as 
the injured party (“lost reasonable expectations”).63 Hence, the first inquiry 
is what constitutes these lost reasonable expectations. Section II.C will 
then examine the practical concerns associated with contract cases—
foreseeability and the need to achieve certainty in determining the amount 
of damages—asking whether those concerns should be applicable in 
market-value-loss cases and if so, whether they should be limited to 
contract cases. 
A central claim of this Article, the normative basis for which will be 
further explained below,64 is that a loss in market value should constitute 
lost reasonable expectations, at least for property that customarily is resold 
as a way to realize its full value.65 The motivation for these sales turns on 
the discrepancy between the economic lifetime of an asset and the 
investment horizon of investors in, or purchasers of, that type of asset.66 
The greater that discrepancy, the more likely a custom will develop to 
resell that type of asset in order to realize its full value. To understand why, 
consider the following types of property, first focusing on financial-market 
securities and then on ordinary products. 
 
                                                                                                                     
deceit from those for breach of contract). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 REPORTER’S NOTE (1981). 
 61. Foley v. Parlier, 68 S.W.3d 870, 884 (Tex. App. 2002) (citing Hart v. Moore, 952 S.W.2d 
90, 97 (Tex. App. 1997)). 
 62. Morris v. Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., 247 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. App. 1952). 
 63. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (articulating that this Article starts with an 
abstract of general understanding, as opposed to an independent normative analysis, of damages to 
model a normative theory of awarding damages for market value loss). 
 64. See infra notes 93–102 and accompanying text (discussing foreseeability). 
 65. By “customarily,” this Article does not mean exclusively.  
 66. Cf. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis 7 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 
2008/43, Nov. 2008), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/ 2008_43online.pdf (“The 
discrepancy between the economic lifetimes of [long-term] assets and the investment horizons of 
most investors poses a dilemma.”). 
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1.  Lost Reasonable Expectations for Financial-Market Securities 
Recall that these securities are divided into debt and equity.67 Whether 
debt securities customarily are resold as a way to realize their full value is 
an empirical question, the answer to which (at least currently) turns on the 
maturity of the securities. For example, short-term debt securities, such as 
commercial paper with maturities between 30 and 270 days,68 are almost 
always held by investors to maturity and rarely are resold.69 Therefore, a 
loss in market value of commercial paper should not constitute lost 
reasonable expectations. 
The analysis is more complex, however, for long-term debt securities, 
partly because of the evolution of the custom of holding-versus-selling 
such debt securities to realize their value. Historically, most long-term debt 
securities were held by investors to maturity.70 Investors expected to 
receive their value through the periodic receipt of principal and interest 
payments.71 
The ability to resell long-term debt securities, however, would give 
investors liquidity that may be needed to pay obligations coming due.72 It 
would also give investors the flexibility to invest in other projects.73 As a 
result, there is a discrepancy between the economic lifetime of long-term 
debt securities and the investment horizon of many investors in those 
securities.  
To minimize this discrepancy, resale (or “secondary”) markets for long-
term debt securities have developed,74 enabling investors to resell these 
types of securities in order to realize their full value.75 The ability to resell 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.   
 68. Commercial paper is a market term for short-term debt securities that typically have 
maturities of 270 days or less. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(3), ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 76 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (2006)). 
 69. TIMOTHY Q. COOK & ROBERT K. LAROCHE, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 113 (7th 
ed. 1993). 
 70. JANE W. D’ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE 124 (1994). 
 71. MAUREEN BURTON, REYNOLD NESIBA & BRUCE BROWN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 56 (2d ed. 2010). 
 72. DEAN CROUSHORE, MONEY & BANKING: A POLICY ORIENTED APPROACH 116 (2007). 
 73. Id. The inability to invest in other projects is an opportunity cost with intrinsic value, as 
demonstrated by hedonic analysis. The hedonic price method is used to estimate the effect on 
property value of individual property assets by estimating the prices of the property’s closest market 
substitutes which do not possess that particular asset (i.e., market substitutes that possess a near-
identical array of assets except for the asset being valued). The hedonics method can be used to 
establish the specific value of opportunity costs from additional commute time to inaccessible debt 
securities. See, e.g., Patrick Bajari & Matthew E. Kahn, Estimating Hedonic Models of Consumer 
Demand with an Application to Urban Sprawl, in HEDONIC METHODS IN HOUSING MARKETS: 
PRICING ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES AND SEGREGATION 129, 144 (Andrea Baranzini et al. eds., 
2008). 
 74. Charles W. Calomiris, Banking and Financial Intermediation, in TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 285, 298 (Benn Steil et al. eds., 2002). 
 75. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BROTT, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATIVE INVESTING: 9 
PRINCIPLES YOU MUST KNOW! 51 (2007). 
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long-term debt securities has become so customary and important that 
more freely salable long-term debt securities typically bear a lower interest 
rate—meaning such securities are more attractive to investors by reason of 
their salability—than less freely salable long-term debt securities.76 The 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has even issued special 
rules enabling investors to more freely resell otherwise resale-restricted 
long-term debt securities.77 
Because long-term debt securities are customarily resold as a way to 
realize their full value, a loss in market value of wrongfully affected long-
term debt securities should theoretically be legally compensable.78 This 
result is directly contra to the decision in the RJR Nabisco case—a decision 
arguably explainable by the court’s failure to recognize the changing 
market practice.79  
Next, consider equity securities. As before, whether these securities 
customarily are resold as a way to realize their full value is an empirical 
question, but one that has a more obvious answer. Equity securities are 
almost always resold to realize their full value because, as presently 
structured, equity securities generally pay investors only dividend 
payments, which represent a rate of return,80 and do not return the 
underlying equity investment until the corporate issuer of the securities 
liquidates.81 Investors are usually unwilling to wait until that time; they 
typically want repayment of their investment within months or years, 
whereas most corporations have unlimited lives.82  
Shareholders, therefore, customarily look to resale of the securities for 
                                                                                                                     
 76. R. CHARLES MOYER, JAMES R. MCGUIGAN & WILLIAM J. KRETLOW, CONTEMPORARY 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 32 (11th ed. 2009). 
 77. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2010) (enabling privately placed long-term debt 
securities to be freely resold to qualified institutional buyers). 
 78. Although long-term debt securities are sometimes held by investors to maturity, that does 
not obviate the fact that long-term debt securities are customarily sold as a way to realize their full 
value. Id. 
 79. The case may also be explainable on its facts, insofar as no covenant appeared to be 
breached. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 80. Modigliani and Miller’s Irrelevance Hypothesis bears out that dividend payments on 
equity securities are akin to payment of interest, but not principal, on debt securities. See CARNEY, 
supra note 12, at 210–19. 
 81. See, e.g., ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES: A SURVEY FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 324 (1995); KAROLINE JUNG-SENSSFELDER, 
EQUITY FINANCING AND COVENANTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL: AN AUGMENTED CONTRACTING 
APPROACH TO OPTIMAL GERMAN CONTRACT DESIGN 22 (2006). 
 82. See JAMES B. HERENDEEN, ISSUES IN ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 231–32 (2008). Even 
an institutional investor will typically match its investments to statistically anticipated payouts, such 
as an insurance company matching its investments to statistically anticipated insured losses or a 
pension fund matching its investments to statistically anticipated retirements. JEFF MADURA, 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 58 (8th ed. 2008). However, absent the corporation’s 
liquidation, investors will not be repaid unless they have the right to require the corporation to 
redeem the securities, which is rare. ASHEESH ADVANI, INVESTORS IN YOUR BACKYARD: HOW TO 
RAISE BUSINESS CAPITAL FROM THE PEOPLE YOU KNOW 348 (2006). 
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return of their investment.83 Indeed, the trading price of stock is regularly 
used, and thus perceived, as a proxy for the measure of the value of the 
stock.84 This may help explain why courts traditionally have been willing 
to recognize market-value-loss damages for wrongfully affected equity 
securities. 
2.  Lost Reasonable Expectations for Ordinary Property 
Whether ordinary property is customarily resold as a way to realize its 
full value is, as before, an empirical question. Consider light bulbs. People 
almost always use them until they stop working.85 As a result, they are not 
customarily resold as a way to realize their full value, and no real 
secondary market for used light bulbs has developed.86 Therefore, a loss in 
market value of wrongfully affected light bulbs should not be legally 
compensable.87 
But contrast light bulbs with houses. Houses are customarily resold as a 
way to realize their full value. This mitigates the discrepancy between the 
economic lifetime (i.e., the useful life) of houses and the investment 
horizon (i.e., the period of time an owner wishes to remain in a given 
house—owners may move away, or they may die) of most homeowners. 
Indeed, without the ability to resell a house, it would almost always be 
more economically rational to rent rather than to buy housing.88 Therefore, 
a loss in market value of wrongfully affected houses should be, and 
generally is,89 legally compensable.    
Next consider automobile ownership, an example somewhat in between 
light bulbs and houses. There is a moderate discrepancy between the 
economic lifetime of automobiles and the investment horizon of 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See JOHN E. MOYE, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 294 (6th ed. 2005). 
 84. The financial media, for example, often focus on whether actions of a firm’s management 
increase share price. IMS RISK SOLUTIONS LTD, INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS SERIES, IMS: 
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH AUDITING 70–71 (David Smith ed., 2004).  
 85. The above discussion focuses on using light bulbs, not on holding light bulbs as inventory 
to sell. 
 86. There might perhaps be a very limited resale market on eBay. See EBAY, 
http://www.ebay.com (last visited May 5, 2011). 
 87. As technology advances, the useful life of light bulbs has been lengthening, and the cost 
of extremely long-life light bulbs is not insignificant. It is therefore conceivable that a robust 
secondary market in used light bulbs might arise in the future, potentially changing the damages 
analysis. See Steve Forbes, Ban Bulb Lunacy, FORBES.COM (Mar. 28, 2011, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0328/billionaires-11-fact-comment-steve-forbes-ban-bulb-
lunacy.html (disputing the notion that long-life light bulbs will save people money in the long run). 
 88. Indeed, where the economic lifetime of any property extends beyond an owner’s 
investment horizon, it would be more economically rational to rent rather than to buy such property, 
absent a secondary market for resale. See, e.g., Miranda Marquit, Rent vs. Owning: When Does it 
Make Sense to Buy?, GOODFINANCIALCENTS.COM (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.goodfinancialcents. 
com/rent-vs-owning-when-does-it-make-sense-to-buy/. 
 89. See, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1896) (holding that the owner’s “just 
compensation” in a partial government taking is not only the value of the land taken but also the 
incidental loss in value caused to the property not taken). 
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automobile purchasers. Many people continue to drive their cars until they 
stop working. But a significant number of people resell their cars after 
several years and purchase new cars.90 The latter behavior is sufficiently 
widespread that it is now almost certainly “customary” for owners to resell 
their cars in order to realize their full value. Indeed, robust de facto used 
car markets have arisen to facilitate these sales.91 Accordingly, a loss in 
market value of wrongfully affected automobiles should, at least 
theoretically, be legally compensable. This helps to explain, at least 
implicitly, the recent Bridgestone/Firestone Tire Cases settlement.92 
C.  Practical Concerns 
The discussion above models a normative theory of damages for market 
value loss, arguing that such loss should be compensable for wrongfully 
affected property that customarily is resold as a way to realize its full 
value. This Section examines the practical concerns associated with 
contract cases—foreseeability and the need to achieve certainty in 
determining the amount of damages—and asks whether those concerns 
should be applicable in market-value-loss cases and if so, whether they 
should be limited to contract cases. 
1.  Foreseeability 
In contract cases, unlike tort cases generally, courts impose a 
requirement of foreseeability beyond the injured party’s lost reasonable 
expectations.93 For example, a purchaser of widgets might reasonably 
expect to receive a million-dollar contract with a third party if widgets 
contractually promised by a seller arrive in time. But the seller, in breach, 
would not be liable for the purchaser’s loss of the third-party contract 
unless the purchaser told the seller that the third-party contract is 
expected.94 The lost-reasonable-expectations requirement is thus 
effectively made bilateral. The articulated rationale is that, in a contract 
context, expectations are bilateral and damages for lost expectations must 
be reasonable from the standpoint of both parties.95 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See, e.g., True Cost to Own Calculator, EDMUNDS.COM, http://www.edmunds.com/ 
apps/cto/CTOintroController (last visited May 5, 2011) (allowing car buyers to factor in resale 
value depreciation rates when choosing a new vehicle). 
 91. See, e.g., KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com (last visited May 5, 2011) (valuing 
used cars based on odometer readings). 
 92. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.   
 94. NEIL C. BLOND & LOUIS PETRILLO, CONTRACTS 189 (7th ed. 2009); accord Miss. Chem. 
Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 287 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 
500, 510 (8th Cir. 1971). English courts express foreseeability in terms of the scope of the duty that 
is assumed. E-mail from Edelman, supra note 11.  
 95. In contrast to contract, where expectations are bilateral, expectations in tort are said to be 
formed unilaterally and, thus, foreseeability of the amount of harm is not considered. See, e.g., 
Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 871 (Colo. 2002) (explaining that where a contracting 
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One might question, however, why that rationale—at least insofar as it 
restricts damages by a bilateral reasonableness requirement—should be 
limited to contract. For example, a tortfeasor might well have expectations 
about the consequences of the tort. An implicit rationale for not taking into 
account the tortfeasor’s expectations in assessing damages is that a tort—
unlike a contract breach—is a wrongful action, and thus only the injured 
party’s expectations should be considered.96 But even that distinction 
between tort and contract might be questioned, because at least some 
contractual breaches are arguably wrongful.97 Absent that distinction, 
market value damages should be generally restricted by a bilateral 
reasonableness requirement, at least if they are not intentionally inflicted.98 
Another rationale for restricting market value damages by a bilateral, or 
at least more demanding, reasonableness requirement is to discourage 
disproportionate penalties and limit the potential for widespread liability. 
Indeed, courts already apply a more demanding lost-reasonable-
expectations requirement in the tort context of pure economic loss, where a 
requirement for imposing damages is that the loss be “particularly 
foreseeable.”99 Imposing some form of bilateral lost-reasonable-
expectations requirement for awarding market-value-loss damages would 
similarly help discourage disproportionate penalties and limit the specter of 
widespread liability.100 
This Article has argued that market-value-loss damages should require 
                                                                                                                     
party can foresee the damages that may arise in consequence of breach, “he presumably will take 
into account the risk that these contingencies will occur while negotiating the contract. Thus, by 
limiting contractual liability to those damages foreseen by the parties at the time the contract was 
formed, [we] ensure[] that the bargain struck reflects a mutually agreeable allocation of the risks 
and costs of breach. In other words, [we] guarantee[] the fairness of a bilateral agreement by 
protecting the parties from unanticipated liability arising in the future. But a tortious act is a 
unilateral invasion of a right taken without regard to any agreement or contract. . . . The victim of a 
tort has no opportunity to negotiate with the tortfeasor—no opportunity to allocate the risk that a 
particular consequence will occur or evaluate the cost if it should. Therefore, whether he reasonably 
contemplated a particular consequence as the probable result of the tort at the time it occurred is 
irrelevant.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 435(1) (1965) (contrasting contract, where expectations are bilateral, with tort, where 
expectations are said to be formed unilaterally and, thus, foreseeability of the amount of harm is not 
considered). 
 96. Cf. Glanville L. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137 
(1951) (drawing on the Kantian notion of moral necessity to develop the idea that one underlying 
tenet of tort law is “ethical retribution”—punishing tortfeasors for the detrimental results of their 
wrongful acts). 
 97. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 452 (2006) (arguing 
that contract breach should be considered immoral in cases where breach damages are insufficient 
to fully protect expectations).  
 98. This Article does not examine the extent to which courts should be more willing to award 
damages for intentionally inflicted—as opposed to negligently inflicted—market value loss. Cf. 
Lamb v. Camden London Borough Council [1981] 1 Q.B. 625 (inversely correlating degree of fault 
and the need for foreseeability).  
 99.  See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112 (N.J. 
1985) (proposing that pure economic loss that is “particularly foreseeable” be recoverable).  
 100.  See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.  
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some form of bilateral lost reasonable expectations. Bilateral reasonable 
expectations are implicit in the claim that a loss in market value should 
constitute lost reasonable expectations, “at least for property that 
customarily is resold as a way to realize its full value.”101 For such 
property, even the defendant should be aware that resale could be within 
the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations.102 
2.  Need for Appropriate Certainty 
The theoretical basis for awarding damages also must be tempered by 
the need for a court to achieve appropriate certainty.103 In the context of 
market value losses, there are at least two ways this need can arise. The 
first is in measuring the amount of the loss. That should not present 
difficulty in most cases, because the very idea of a market value loss 
assumes there is a de jure or de facto market.104 A more difficult problem, 
however, is temporal: the need to fix in time the amount of the loss.  
For example, if the market value of wrongfully affected property falls 
but then later increases, the loss would have merely been temporary. A 
possible solution might be to require that an objective event occurs—such 
as actual resale of the property105—that fixes the market value loss to the 
injured party. This requirement would also limit windfall payments to 
parties who hold their properties through the property’s economic lifetime. 
Admittedly, an injured party who believes the market value may increase 
might try to “game” the system, such as by reselling the property to fix the 
loss while concurrently buying back similar property; but the law already 
deals with similar manipulation in other contexts.106 
                                                                                                                     
 101.  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Should a loss in market value constitute lost reasonable expectations, at least in a tort 
context, for property that is in fact resold to realize its full value, even though resale is not 
customary? Professor Andrew Burrows raises this question, but he observes that even such a lower 
threshold for obtaining market value damages should be subject to a requirement of “remoteness.” 
E-mail from Andrew Burrows, Professor of the Law of England, All Souls College, University of 
Oxford, to the author (Oct. 30, 2010) (on file with author). I would argue that the requirement that 
the property be of the type that is customarily resold is the equivalent of a remoteness requirement. 
Cf. Jolley v. Sutton London Borough Council [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1082, 1091 (“Unless the injury is of 
a description which was reasonably foreseeable, it is . . . ‘too remote’ [to be compensable]. It is also 
agreed that what must have been foreseen is not the precise injury which occurred but injury of a 
given description. The foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus.”). 
 103.  See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See supra Section III.B. In some cases, however, there may be difficulty measuring the 
amount of the loss, such as when property is sold long after the event that reduces its market value 
has occurred. To some extent, statutes of limitation will mitigate this practical concern. 
 105.  Could that create a perverse incentive, however? For example, if a holder of wrongfully 
affected bonds must sell the bonds at a loss in order to be compensated, might that sometimes 
contribute, even if only marginally, to further depressing the resale price of those bonds? 
 106.  The U.S. Internal Revenue Code, for example, disallows recognition of a tax loss if a 
taxpayer sells stock that has suffered a loss, replacing it with “substantially identical stock.” 
26 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2006). Cf. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 
(2010) (“Some arbitrage techniques are pervasive and grudgingly accepted as part of the system, 
like harvesting tax losses at year-end by holding the winners in one’s stock portfolio while selling 
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This Article, therefore, proposes that a loss in market value of 
wrongfully affected property should be legally compensable if the property 
is customarily (although not necessarily exclusively) resold as a way to 
realize its full value. Because the motivation to resell property to realize its 
full value turns on the discrepancy between the economic lifetime of the 
property and the investment horizon of investors in, or purchasers of, that 
type of property, what is customary will be an empirical question that may 
change over time. To minimize the practical problem of computing 
damages where the fallen market value of wrongfully affected property 
later increases, the amount of otherwise appropriate damages should be 
tied to an objective event, such as an actual resale of the affected property. 
Part III examines how this largely normative approach should be 
informed, if at all, by how courts have treated market value loss.  
III.  JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS AS INFORMING NORMATIVE THEORY 
Any rule for awarding damages, being administered by judges, should 
be informed by the realities of judicial behavior. To that end, this Part 
attempts to examine what types of considerations have affected judicial 
decisionmaking in market-value-loss cases and to analyze how a rule for 
compensating market value losses should address those considerations. 
A.  Asymmetric Information 
Judges, like many others, often buy and sell stock. Recognizing that 
equity securities are “purchased with an eye toward a later sale,” judges are 
usually willing to compensate investors for market value losses.107 In 
contrast, judges are not always fully informed about markets for debt 
securities. In the RJR Nabisco case, for example, the court was apparently 
unaware, or at least unappreciative, of the importance to investors of bond 
trading.108 This is not completely surprising. The minimum amount to 
purchase a bond tends to be high,109 so judges may be personally 
unfamiliar with them. Furthermore, many bonds are traded only among 
institutional investors,110 so individual judges would have no personal 
familiarity with that market.111  
                                                                                                                     
the losers and replacing them with similar [though not substantially identical] stocks.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 107.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 108.  See, e.g., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (declining to recognize market value 
loss as legally compensable, reasoning that such loss did not constitute the “fruits of the agreement” 
under which the bonds were issued). 
 109.  See, e.g., Types of Bonds, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/investing/ 
bonds/types (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (stating that the minimum purchase price of a corporate 
bond is typically $5,000).  
 110.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (referencing the market for large institutional 
investors pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2010)). 
 111.  To some extent, this may reflect a corollary to the availability heuristic. Under that 
heuristic, people overestimate the frequency or likelihood of an event when examples of, or 
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To reduce this information asymmetry, a judge facing the question of 
whether to compensate for market value losses should engage in a factual 
inquiry as to whether the wrongfully affected property is customarily—
though not necessarily exclusively—resold as a way to realize its full 
value. 
B.  De Facto and De Jure Markets 
Information asymmetry is not the full story, however. In the RJR 
Nabisco case, even though the court explicitly recognized that investors 
had the right to sell their bonds at any time in a secondary market (and 
therefore implicitly recognized that they were purchased with an eye 
toward a later sale),112 the court refused to compensate for the loss in 
market value of the bonds.113 This may reflect ignorance of the importance 
of de facto secondary markets.  
De facto secondary markets can be as legitimate and important to 
commerce as de jure markets. Although equity securities are usually traded 
on formal markets like the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, 
bonds and other debt securities are almost always traded on de facto 
markets.114 In the case of debt securities, these are informal markets 
operated through computers of brokerage houses and banks.115 Similarly, 
car owners commonly sell their automobiles in de facto markets.116 To the 
extent de facto markets facilitate the transfer of property from willing 
sellers to willing buyers, they should be as important to advancing 
commerce, and therefore as legitimate as de jure markets.117  
Nonetheless, some de facto markets may be so obscure that the 
possibility of wrongfully affected property falling in market value may not 
be foreseeable. The limitation on compensating for wrongfully affected 
property that is customarily resold in that market as a way to realize its full 
value should help obviate this concern.118 
                                                                                                                     
associations with, similar events are easily brought to mind. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah 
Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). The corollary 
is that people undervalue the importance of things with which they are unfamiliar. 
 112.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 113.  Id. at 1518. 
 114.  ANNETTE THAU, THE BOND BOOK: EVERYTHING INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BONDS 
7–8 (2d ed. 2001). 
 115.  NORMAN M. SCARBOROUGH, BUSINESS: GAINING THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 524 (1992). 
 116.  See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 117.  Cf. HERENDEEN, supra note 82, at 231–32 (arguing that de jure stock markets and de facto 
bond markets provide the same six key contributions to commerce: (1) converting illiquid assets 
into relatively liquid assets; (2) reducing the cost of funds to borrowers, especially long-term 
borrowers; (3) allowing for the separation of ownership and control; (4) permitting the separation of 
saving and investing decisions; (5) making possible a market for corporate control; and (6) 
facilitating the determination of a firm’s value). 
 118.  See supra Section II.C. 
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C.  Administrative Ease 
Another consideration that may affect judicial decisionmaking in 
market-value-loss cases is administrative ease. This consideration could tie 
into the foregoing distinction between de jure and de facto markets; a court 
might fear that pricing—and thus ascertaining the amount of losses—is 
more certain in de jure than de facto markets. To the extent that concern 
exists, it is probably unfounded; pricing in de facto markets should be 
reliable and ascertainable because it is the increased liquidity common to 
both de facto and de jure secondary markets that facilitates the 
determination of an asset’s current worth (or at least what the market 
thinks the asset is worth).119  
Courts also may be concerned that compensating for market value loss 
could raise other valuation questions.120 This Article has examined what 
appears to be the most difficult valuation question, concluding it should be 
manageable.121 Judges nonetheless should be circumspect when making 
valuations, ensuring that the judicial system does not inadvertently 
function as insurance for inherently risky investments.  
D.  Reluctance to Interfere with Management Discretion 
When the wrongfully affected property consists of corporate securities, 
judges may sometimes be concerned that compensating investors for 
market value losses could interfere with corporate governance. In the RJR 
Nabisco case, for example, the alleged wrongful action was that RJR’s 
management caused the corporation to undergo a leveraged buyout.122 A 
decision to award damages might then be seen as interfering with the 
business judgment rule, in which managers who essentially act in good 
faith and without conflicts will not be subject to liability.123  
The rationale for the business judgment rule, however, is to enable 
corporate managers to take reasonable business risks.124 If a judge awards 
market-value-loss damages against the corporation itself, rather than 
against its individual managers, investors would be protected without (at 
least directly) jeopardizing management business judgment. Furthermore, 
any award of damages presumes a threshold inquiry into whether the 
                                                                                                                     
 119.  See, e.g., HERENDEEN, supra note 82, at 232; supra note 91 (observing the reliability of 
pricing in the de facto used car market). Compare JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE 
FINANCE § 8.2 (2007) (discussing how to accurately price bonds), with ESME FAERBER, ALL ABOUT 
BONDS, BOND MUTUAL FUNDS, AND BOND ETFS 14–15 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing relatively small 
price variations in the de facto bond market). 
 120.  Cf. supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
 121.  See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text (examining the temporal valuation 
problem of fixing the amount of the loss in time). 
 122.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 123.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 124.  Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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property was wrongfully affected in the first place. If the answer is no, a 
court would not even get to the issue of damages.125  
IV.  SYNTHESIS AND APPLICATIONS 
A.  Synthesis of a Rule to Compensate for Loss of Market Value 
This Article proposes that a loss in market value of wrongfully affected 
property should be legally compensable if the property is customarily 
(although not necessarily exclusively) resold as a way to realize its full 
value.126 The motivation to resell property to realize its full value turns on 
the discrepancy between the economic lifetime of the property and the 
investment horizon of investors in, or purchasers of, that type of property 
(such as the discrepancy between the long-term maturity of corporate 
bonds and the investment horizon of most bondholders); therefore, what is 
customary is an empirical question that may change over time. A judge 
facing the question of whether to compensate for market value losses 
should therefore engage in a factual inquiry as to whether resale is a 
customary way to realize the wrongfully affected property’s full value. In 
making this inquiry, judges should be aware that de facto secondary 
markets can be as legitimate and important to commerce as more formal de 
jure markets.  
In assessing damages, judges should be aware of certain practical 
considerations, perhaps the most significant of which is deciding how to 
compute damages where the fallen market value of wrongfully affected 
property could later increase. One solution would be to tie that 
computation to an objective event, such as an actual resale of the affected 
property. 
B.  Application of the Rule 
1.  Toyota Car Recalls 
As a result of recent well-publicized safety violations, the resale value 
of certain models of Toyota automobiles has fallen significantly.127 In a 
lawsuit by a car owner against Toyota, how should a court assess a claim 
for market value damages? 
A threshold question is whether Toyota acted wrongfully and thus 
                                                                                                                     
 125.  See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
 126.  One colleague observed the potential for a procyclical feedback effect between a rule 
implementing market value damages, such as the rule articulated here, and the creation of markets 
for resale. Comment of Joshua Getzler, Reader in Legal History, St. Hugh’s College, University of 
Oxford, at University of Oxford Law and Finance Workshop (Nov. 16, 2010). I think that any such 
feedback effect would have marginal impact. 
 127.  U.S. News & World Report, Best Cars: Toyota Resale Values Take Another Hit, 
USNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2010, 10:33 AM), http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/daily-
news/100209-Toyota-Resale-Values-Take-Another-Hit/. 
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should be liable, in principle, for damages resulting from the safety 
violations. That question is beyond this Article’s scope.128 Assuming, 
however, that Toyota did act wrongfully, this Article’s question is whether 
Toyota should be liable to Toyota car owners for that fallen resale value.  
In answering this question, a judge should first engage in a factual 
inquiry as to whether resale is a customary way to realize an automobile’s 
full value. Without independently engaging in that inquiry, it would appear 
that although many people continue driving their cars until they stop 
working, a significant number resell their cars after several years and 
purchase new cars—reflecting the discrepancy between the relatively long 
useful life of automobiles and the shorter timespan that many individuals 
want to own a particular car. Resale, therefore, would appear to be a 
customary way to realize an automobile’s full value. 
Toyota should therefore be liable, in theory, to Toyota car owners for 
that fallen resale value.129 But requiring Toyota to pay that market value 
differential to all affected car owners would provide a windfall, at Toyota’s 
expense, to car owners that either continue driving their Toyotas until they 
stop working or resell their Toyotas at a time when the market value of 
their cars has risen. To mitigate these windfalls, damages for fallen market 
value should be computed only if and when the cars are resold. Toyota 
should not be liable for the fallen market value of a car that is not resold. 
And Toyota should only be liable for the incrementally fallen market value 
if a car is resold at a price above the originally fallen market value.130 The 
fact that a car owner may resell a car in a de facto market should not limit 
the assessment of market value damages, so long as the de facto market 
allows reasonably determinable pricing.131 
2.  BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill 
The BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill resulted from an explosion on 
April 20, 2010 on BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of 
                                                                                                                     
 128.  Similarly, to the extent that question involves issues of pure economic loss, the analysis 
assumes that some form of compensation is otherwise appropriate under applicable law and focuses 
on whether that compensation should include market value loss. See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
 129.  In practice, however, whether Toyota would be liable to Toyota car owners for that fallen 
resale value may depend on the particular cause of action. The Restatement (Third) of Products 
Liability, for example, states that there is no recovery under the tort law of products liability for the 
loss of value suffered by someone who has been sold a defective product. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. d (1998). A Toyota purchaser might, however, be able to assert an 
additional cause of action for misrepresentation. E-mail from Christie, supra note 45. 
 130.  For example, if a particular Toyota car’s resale value falls from $12,000 to $10,000 as a 
result of a recall caused by Toyota’s wrongful action, and the car owner sells the car at a time when 
its market value has increased by $1,000 (possibly as a result of the recall becoming a distant 
memory or questions as to whether the recall was really necessary), then the amount of market value 
damages should be $1,000, not $2,000.  
 131.  Such as would be the case for selling used cars. See KELLEY BLUE BOOK, supra note 91. 
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Mexico.132 The spill caused extensive damage to the Gulf ecosystem and to 
the area’s tourism and fishing industries.133 BP and the U.S. Government 
are in accord that BP’s mistakes led to the spill,134 but questions remain as 
to how to compensate for losses.  
This Article’s analysis can help to inform this determination for 
property that has a de jure or de facto market value that was lowered by the 
oil spill. Such property might include, for example, financial securities in 
affected fisheries, hotels, and restaurants and affected fishing boats, hotels, 
and restaurants owned directly by individuals or other third parties. 
A threshold question is whether BP acted wrongfully and thus, in 
principle, should be liable for damages resulting from the oil spill. That 
question is beyond this Article’s scope,135 although BP appears to have 
acknowledged responsibility. Assuming that BP did act wrongfully, this 
Article’s question is whether it should be liable for the fallen market value 
of affected property. 
In answering this question, a judge should first engage in a factual 
inquiry for each type of affected property as to whether resale is a 
customary way to realize its full value. The fact that equity securities and 
long-term debt securities are generally customarily resold as a way to 
realize their full value136 does not necessarily mean that all types of those 
securities are customarily resold.137 To the extent the judge finds that resale 
is a customary way to realize the full value of that type of property, BP 
should be liable, at least theoretically, for the property’s fallen resale value.  
For those properties, however, BP should be required to pay 
compensation only if and when a property owner actually resells the 
property.138 Furthermore, BP should then be required to pay only the 
incrementally fallen market value if the property is resold at a price above 
the originally fallen market value.139 The fact that property may be resold 
                                                                                                                     
 132.  Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, NYTIMES.COM (Apr. 21, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html?_r=1&ref=gulf_of_mexico_2010. 
 133.  David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, Oil Spill Threatens Gulf Region’s Ecosystem 
and Fishing, Tourism and Shipping Industries, WASH. POST, May 2, 2010, at A01. 
 134.  Steven Mufson, Gulf Oil Spill: BP Briefs on Breakdowns, Mistakes, WASHPOST.COM 
(May 26, 2010, 7:59 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/ 
AR2010052604888.html. 
 135.  Again, to the extent that question involves issues of pure economic loss, the analysis 
assumes that some form of compensation is otherwise appropriate under applicable law and focuses 
on whether that compensation should include market value loss. See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
 136.  See supra Section II.B. 
 137.  See supra text accompanying notes 68–69. 
 138.  Recall that this limitation helps to mitigate windfall payments. One may ask whether 
damages should be further mitigated by requiring a property owner who knows or should know that 
the property itself will receive direct compensation should wait until that occurs to engage in a 
resale. At least under the so-called efficient market hypothesis, market prices should adjust rapidly 
if not virtually immediately based on new information (such as knowledge of the future direct 
compensation), obviating any need to wait until the direct compensation actually occurs. 
 139.  Again, this is to mitigate windfall payments. 
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in a de facto, not de jure, market should not limit the assessment of market 
value damages, so long as the de facto market allows reasonably 
determinable pricing.140 
Any concern that imposing market-value-loss damages would create 
disproportionate penalties or widespread liability should, at least to some 
extent, be mitigated by compensating only for wrongfully affected property 
that is customarily resold as a way to realize its full value.141 Nonetheless, 
given the extraordinary potential scope of damages from the BP oil spill, it 
seems reasonable for a court to consider, at least on a case-by-case basis, 
whether a further foreseeability limitation—perhaps akin to the 
“particularly foreseeable” limitation that is sometimes applied in the pure-
economic-loss context to discourage disproportionate penalties and limit 
the specter of widespread liability142—should also apply to market value 
losses in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored a new way to think about property rights by 
applying the fundamental proposition that damages should be equal to the 
lost reasonable expectations of a person in the same circumstances as the 
injured party to the question of whether damages should include losses in 
market value caused by wrongful actions. The Article argued that for 
property that is customarily resold as a way to realize its full value, 
damages should include those losses.  
Whether property is customarily resold as a way to realize its full value 
is ultimately an empirical question. The greater the discrepancy between 
the economic lifetime of an asset and the investment horizon of investors 
in, or purchasers of, that type of asset, the more likely that custom will 
develop.  
For example, people almost always use light bulbs until they stop 
working. Therefore, a loss in market value of wrongfully affected light 
bulbs should not be legally compensable. Similarly, short-term debt 
securities, such as commercial paper, are almost always held by investors 
to maturity and are rarely resold. Therefore, damages should not include 
alleged losses in market value of commercial paper.  
On the other hand, long-term debt securities, such as bonds, are now 
rarely held by investors to maturity but instead are commonly resold, 
giving investors liquidity to pay their obligations and the flexibility to 
                                                                                                                     
 140.  See supra Section IV.A.  
 141.  See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (describing this, effectively, as a bilateral 
lost-reasonable-expectations requirement). 
 142.  See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112 (N.J. 
1985) (proposing that pure economic loss that is “particularly foreseeable” be recoverable). While 
the “particularly foreseeable” limitation may provide one framework for judges applying market-
loss-value damages, the limitation in the context of pure economic loss is beyond the scope of this 
Article.   
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invest in other projects. A very significant discrepancy has developed 
between the economic lifetime of long-term debt securities and the shorter 
investment horizon of many investors in those securities. A loss in market 
value of wrongfully affected long-term debt securities should therefore be 
legally compensable. This result parallels the well-established case law that 
compensates homeowners and shareholders for the loss in market value of 
such property caused by wrongful actions. The case law’s implicit 
normative justification is that both houses and shares of stock are 
customarily resold as a way to realize their full value because of the very 
significant discrepancy between the economic lifetime of houses and stock 
and the shorter investment horizon of purchasers of such assets.  
For some property, like automobiles, there is a more moderate but still 
significant discrepancy between the property’s economic lifetime and the 
investment horizon of purchasers. Some people drive their cars until they 
stop running, whereas others resell their cars after several years. The latter 
behavior has become quite customary (though not exclusive), and indeed 
robust de facto used car markets have arisen to facilitate resales. Therefore, 
a loss in market value of wrongfully affected automobiles should be legally 
compensable.  
This Article has examined the process by which courts should make 
these types of determinations, including addressing problems of 
foreseeability and achieving certainty in measuring damages. In that latter 
context, the Article finds that de facto resale markets can be as legitimate 
and important to commerce as more formal de jure markets, and that 
pricing in de facto markets should be reliable and ascertainable. 
